The regulatory process for market authorization of medical diagnostic and therapeutic products is fraught with ethical dilemmas that regulators outside the medical industry do not face. The consequences of approving an ineffective therapy with potentially dangerous side effects (a “Type I error” or false positive) must be weighed against not approving a safe and effective therapy (a “Type II error” or false negative) that could help ease the burden of disease for many patients. Regulators must strike the proper balance by considering multiple factors, including scientific merit; clinical evidence from randomized, control trials; the burden of disease; the current standard of care and alternatives; and patient preferences. How these factors are—and should be—weighed is not always clear, which only encourages criticism by whichever stakeholder group disagrees with the decision.

Academic institutions play a central role in the biotech industry through technology licensing and the creation of startups, but few data are available on their performance and the magnitude of their impact. Here we present a systematic study of technology licensing by one such institution, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Using data on the 76 therapeutics-focused life sciences companies formed through MIT’s Technology Licensing Office from 1983 to 2017, we construct several measures of impact, including MIT patents cited in the Orange Book, capital raised, outcomes from mergers and acquisitions, patents granted to MIT intellectual property licensees, drug candidates discovered and US drug approvals—a key benchmark of innovation in the biopharmaceutical industry. As of December 2017, Orange Book listings for four approved small-molecule drugs cite MIT patents, but another 31 FDA-approved drugs (excluding candidates acquired after phase 3) had some involvement of MIT licensees. Fifty-five percent of the latter were either a new molecular entity or a new biological entity, and 55% were granted priority review, an indication that they address an unmet medical need. The methodology described here may be a useful framework for other academic institutions to track outcomes of intellectual property in the therapeutics domain.

We propose a heuristic approach to modeling investor behavior by simulating combinations of simpler systematic investment strategies associated with well-known behavioral biases—in functional forms motivated by an extensive review of the behavioral finance literature—using parameters calibrated from historical data. We compute the investment performance of these heuristics individually and in pairwise combinations using both simulated and historical asset-class returns. The mean-reversion or momentum nature of a heuristic can often explain its effect on performance, depending on whether asset returns are consistent with such dynamics. These algorithms show that seemingly irrational investor behavior may, in fact, have been shaped by evolutionary forces and can be effective in certain environments and maladaptive in others.

Current brain research, innovation, regulatory, and funding systems are artificially siloed, creating boundaries in our understanding of the brain based on constructs such as aging, mental health, and/or neurology, when these systems are all inextricably integral.

Grand strategy provides a broad framework that helps to guide all elements of a major, long-term project. There are converging global trends resulting from the COVID pandemic compelling a Brain Capital Grand Strategy: widespread appreciation of the rise in brain health issues (e.g., increase prevalence of mental illness and high rates of persons with age-related cognitive impairment contracting COVID), increased automation, job loss and underemployment, radical restructuring of health systems, rapid consumer adoption and acceptance of digital and remote solutions, and recognition of the need for economic reimagination. If we respond constructively to this crisis, the COVID pandemic could catalyze institutional change and a better social contract.

Current business models have struggled to support early-stage drug development. In this paper, we study an alternative financing model, the megafund structure, to fund drug discovery. We extend the framework proposed in previous studies to account for correlation between phase transitions in drug development projects, thus making the model a more realistic representation of biopharma research and development. In addition, we update the parameters used in our simulation with more recent estimates of the probability of success (PoS). We find that the performance of the megafund becomes less attractive when correlation between projects is introduced. However, the risk of default and the expected returns of the vanilla megafund remain promising even under moderate levels of correlation. In addition, we find that a leveraged megafund outperforms an equity-only structure over a wide range of assumptions about correlation and PoS.

This is an edited version of a talk given at the Robert C. Merton 75th Birthday Celebration Conference held at MIT on August 5 and 6, 2019. A video of the talk is available at https://bit.ly/2nvITM6. This article is one of a pair of articles published in this volume about Robert C. Merton's contributions to the science of financial economics. The other article in this pair is “Robert C. Merton and the Science of Finance” by Zvi Bodie.

We compare and contrast the expected duration and number of infections and deaths averted among several designs for clinical trials of COVID-19 vaccine candidates, including traditional and adaptive randomized clinical trials and human challenge trials. Using epidemiological models calibrated to the current pandemic, we simulate the time course of each clinical trial design for 756 unique combinations of parameters, allowing us to determine which trial design is most effective for a given scenario. A human challenge trial provides maximal net benefits—averting an additional 1.1M infections and 8,000 deaths in the U.S. compared to the next best clinical trial design—if its set-up time is short or the pandemic spreads slowly. In most of the other cases, an adaptive trial provides greater net benefits.

We provide a critical review of macroeconomic models used for monetary policy at central banks from a finance perspective. We review the history of monetary policy modeling, survey the core monetary models used by major central banks, and construct an illustrative model for those readers who are unfamiliar with the literature. Within this framework, we highlight several important limitations of current models and methods, including the fact that local-linearization approximations omit important nonlinear dynamics, yielding biased impulse-response analysis and parameter estimates. We also propose new features for the next generation of macrofinancial policy models, including: a substantial role for a financial sector, the government balance sheet and unconventional monetary policies; heterogeneity, reallocation, and redistribution effects; the macroeconomic impact of large nonlinear risk-premium dynamics; time-varying uncertainty; financial sector and systemic risks; imperfect product market and markups; and further advances in solution, estimation, and evaluation methods for dynamic quantitative structural models.

We use a global survey of over 22,400 individual investors, 4,892 financial advisors, and 2,060 institutional investors between 2015 and 2017 to elicit their asset allocation behavior and risk preferences. We find substantially different behaviors among these three groups of market participants. Most institutional investors exhibit highly contrarian reactions to past returns in their equity allocations. Financial advisors are also mostly contrarian; a few of them demonstrate passive behavior. However, individual investors tend to extrapolate past performance. We use a clustering algorithm to partition individuals into five distinct types: passive investors, risk avoiders, extrapolators, contrarians, and optimistic investors. Across demographic categories, older investors tend to be more passive and risk averse.

We develop a new cryptographic platform called SCRAM (Secure Cyber Risk Aggregation and Measurement) that allows multiple entities to compute aggregate cyber-risk measures without requiring any entity to disclose its own sensitive data on cyberattacks, penetrations, and losses. Using the SCRAM platform, we present results from two computations in a pilot study with six large private-sector companies: (1) benchmarks of the adoption rates of 171 critical security measures and (2) links between monetary losses from 49 security incidents and the specific sub-control failures implicated in each incident. These results provide insight into problematic cyber-risk-control areas that need additional scrutiny and/or investment, but in a completely anonymized and privacy-preserving way.

Advances in financial technology have made tax-loss harvesting more feasible for retail investors than such strategies were in the past. We evaluated the magnitude of this “tax alpha” with the use of historical data from the CRSP monthly database for the 500 securities with the largest market capitalizations from 1926 to 2018. Given long-term and short-term capital gains tax rates of 15% and 35%, respectively, we found that a tax-loss-harvesting strategy yielded a before-transaction-cost tax alpha of 1.08% per year for our sample period. When the strategy was constrained by the “wash sale rule,” the tax alpha decreased from 1.08% per year to 0.82% per year.

The recent destructive outbreak of the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, that emerged from Wuhan, China, and rapidly spread to Europe and North America, demonstrates beyond doubt that emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) are a clear and present danger to the world and its economy. Uncontrolled outbreaks of EIDs can devastate populations around the globe, both in terms of lives lost and economic value destroyed. Emerging and re-emerging strains of infectious disease have become more diverse over time, and outbreaks have become more frequent. In 2006, Larry Brilliant stated that 90 percent of the epidemiologists in his confidence agreed that there would be a large pandemic—in which 1 billion people would sicken, 165 million would die, and the global economy would lose $1-3 trillion—within two generations. In 2020, this remarkable statement is playing out with each passing day.

In the midst of epidemics such as COVID-19, therapeutic candidates are unlikely to be able to complete the usual multi-year clinical trial and regulatory approval process within the course of an outbreak. We apply a Bayesian adaptive patient-centered model—which minimizes the expected harm of false positives and false negatives—to optimize the clinical trial development path during such outbreaks. When the epidemic is more infectious and fatal, the Bayesian-optimal sample size in the clinical trial is lower and the optimal statistical significance level is higher. For COVID-19 (assuming a static Ro = 2 and initial infection percentage of 0.1%), the optimal significance level is 7.1% for a clinical trial of a non-vaccine anti-infective therapeutic clinical trial and 13.6% for that of a vaccine. For a dynamic Ro ranging from 2 to 4, the corresponding values are 14.4% and 26.4%, respectively. Our results illustrate the importance of adapting the clinical trial design and the regulatory approval process to the specific parameters and stage of the epidemic.

The healthcare industry in the United States (U.S.) is a complex ecosystem with many different stakeholders. Unlike the universal single-payer healthcare systems of many European countries,the accessibility of prescription drugs in the U.S. is largely determined by contract negotiations between health plans and drug manufacturers about formulary placement. These negotiations can sometimes result in higher out-of-pocket costs for the patient, since the current structure of the U.S. healthcare system creates a perverse incentive for many health plans to elicit higher rebates from drug manufacturers in exchange for formulary placement of brand-name drugs, thereby increasing patients’ out-of-pocket costs.

A key driver in biopharmaceutical investment decisions is the probability of success of a drug development program. We estimate the probabilities of success (PoS) of clinical trials for vaccines and other anti-infective therapeutics using 43,414 unique triplets of clinical trial, drug, and disease between January 1, 2000, and January 7, 2020, yielding 2,544 vaccine programs and 6,829 non-vaccine programs targeting infectious diseases. The overall estimated PoS for an industry-sponsored vaccine program is 39.6%, and 16.3% for an industry-sponsored anti-infective therapeutic. Among industry-sponsored vaccines programs, only 12 out of 27 disease categories have seen at least one approval, with the most successful being against monkeypox (100%), rotavirus (78.7%), and Japanese encephalitis (67.6%). The three infectious diseases with the highest PoS for industry-sponsored nonvaccine therapeutics are smallpox (100%), CMV (31.8%), and onychomycosis (29.8%). Nonindustry- sponsored vaccine and non-vaccine development programs have lower overall PoSs: 6.8% and 8.2%, respectively. Viruses involved in recent outbreaks—MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika—have had a combined total of only 45 non-vaccine development programs initiated over the past two decades, and no approved therapy to date (Note: our data was obtained just before the COVID-19 outbreak and do not contain information about the programs targeting this disease.) These estimates offer guidance both to biopharma investors as well as to policymakers seeking to identify areas most likely to be undeserved by private-sector engagement and in need of public-sector support.