with Gary P. Pisano
with Edward Jung, Project Syndicate
"As price-gouging practices by a handful of drug companies attract headlines, one troubling aspect of the story remains underplayed. Exorbitant increases in the prices of existing drugs, including generics, are motivated not just by crass profiteering but by a deep skepticism about the economic feasibility of developing new drugs. That skepticism is justified.
"Traditional models for funding drug development are faltering. In the US and many other developed countries, the average cost of bringing a new drug to market has skyrocketed, even as patents on some of the industry’s most profitable drugs have expired. Venture capital has pulled back from early-stage life-sciences companies, and big pharmaceutical companies have seen fewer drugs reach the market per dollar spent on research and development..."
with Simon A. Levin, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
In this Op-Ed Piece, MIT Sloan Professor Andrew Lo and Princeton Professor Simon Levin write, "We propose that the financial system has crossed a threshold of complexity where the system is evolving faster than regulators and regulations can keep pace. For example, the system is now truly globally connected, but coordination across sovereign jurisdictions is difficult to achieve. This new situation calls for a new perspective, one based on a different paradigm than the ones on which financial regulation is currently based, such as efficient markets, rational expectations, and models patterned after the physical sciences.
with Jose Maria Fernandez and Roger M. Stein
with William Li, Pablo Azar, David Larochelle, Phil Hill, Journal of Business & Technology Law
The agglomeration of rules and regulations over time has produced a body of legal code that no single individual can fully comprehend. This complexity produces inefficiencies, makes the processes of understanding and changing the law difficult,and frustrates the fundamental principle that the law should provide fair notice to the governed. In this Article, we take a quantitative, unbiased, and software-engineering approach to analyze the evolution of the United States Code from 1926 to today. Software engineers frequently face the challenge of understanding and managing large, structured collections of instructions, directives, and conditional statements, and we adapt and apply their techniques to the U.S. Code over time. Our work produces insights into the structure of the U.S. Code as a whole, its strengths and vulnerabilities, and new ways of thinking about individual laws. For example, we identify the first appearance and spread of important terms in the U.S. Code like “whistleblower” and “privacy.” We also analyze and visualize the network structure of certain substantial reforms,including the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and show how the interconnections of references can increase complexity and create the potential for unintended consequences. Our work is a timely illustration of computational approaches to law as the legal profession embraces technology for scholarship in order to increase efficiency and to improve access to justice.
with Thomas J. Brennan, Critical Finance Review
In Brennan and Lo (2010), a mean-variance efficient frontier is defined as “impossible” if every portfolio on that frontier has negative weights, which is incompatible with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) requirement that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient. We prove that as the number of assets n grows, the probability that a randomly chosen frontier is impossible tends to one at a geometric rate, implying that the set of parameters for which the CAPM holds is extremely rare. Levy and Roll (2014) argue that while such “possible”frontiers are rare, they are ubiquitous. In this reply, we show that this is not the case; possible frontiers are not only rare,but they occupy an isolated region of mean-variance parameter space that becomes increasingly remote as n increases. Ingersoll (2014) observes that parameter restrictions can rule out impossible frontiers, but in many cases these restrictions contradict empirical fact and must be questioned rather than blindly imposed.
with Sandra M. Forman, Monica Shilling, Grace K. Sweeney, Journal of Investment Management
A business development company (BDC) is a type of closed-end investment fund with certain relaxed requirements that allow it to raise money in the public equity and debt markets, and can be used to fund multiple early-stage biomedical ventures, using financial diversification to de-risk translational medicine. By electing to be a “Regulated Investment Company” for tax purposes, a BDC can avoid double taxation on income and net capital gains distributed to its shareholders. BDCs are ideally suited for long-term investors in biomedical innovation, including: (i) investors with biomedical expertise who understand the risks of the FDA approval process, (ii) “banking entities,” now prohibited from investing in hedge funds and private equity funds by the Volcker Rule, but who are permitted to invest in BDCs, subject to certain restrictions, and (iii) retail investors, who traditionally have had to invest in large pharmaceutical companies to gain exposure to similar assets. We describe the history of BDCs, summarize the requirements for creating and managing them, and conclude with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the BDC structure for funding biomedical innovation.
with Mila Getmansky, Peter A. Lee
The hedge-fund industry has grown rapidly over the past two decades, offering investors unique investment opportunities that often reflect more complex risk exposures than those of traditional investments. In this article, we present a selective review of the recent academic literature on hedge funds as well as updated empirical results for this industry. Our review is written from several distinct perspectives: the investor’s, the portfolio manager’s, the regulator’s, and the academic’s. Each of these perspectives offers a different set of insights into the financial system, and the combination provides surprisingly rich implications for the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, investment management, systemic risk, financial regulation, and other aspects of financial theory and practice.
Culture is a potent force in shaping individual and group behavior, yet it has received scant attention in the context of financial risk management and the recent financial crisis. I present a brief overview of the role of culture according to psychologists, sociologists, and economists, and then present a specific framework for analyzing culture in the context of financial practices and institutions in which three questions are answered: (1) What is culture?; (2) Does it matter?; and (3) Can it be changed? I illustrate the utility of this framework by applying it to five concrete situations—Long Term Capital Management; AIG Financial Products; Lehman Brothers and Repo 105; Société Générale’s rogue trader; and the SEC and the Madoff Ponzi scheme—and conclude with a proposal to change culture via “behavioral risk management.”
with David E. Fagnan, N. Nora Yang, John C. McKew, Science Translational Medicine
The portfolio of the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) rare diseases therapeutic development program comprises 28 research projects initiated at the preclinical stage. Historical data reveal substantially lower costs and higher success rates but longer preclinical timelines for the NCATS projects relative to the industry averages for early-stage translational medical research and development (R&D) typically cited in literature. Here, we evaluate the potential risks and rewards of investing in a portfolio of rare-disease therapeutics. Using a “megafund” financing structure, NCATS data, and valuation estimates from a panel of industry experts, we simulate a hypothetical megafund in which senior and junior debt yielded 5 and 8%, respectively. The simulated expected return to equity was 14.7%, corresponding to a modified internal rate of return of 21.6%. These returns and the likelihood of private-sector funding can be enhanced through third-party funding guarantees from philanthropies, patient advocacy groups, and government agencies.